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Factors Affecting the Accuracy of Eyewitness Identification
Abstract
In lieu of an abstract, below is the article's first paragraph.
We've all experienced, at one time or another, our own memories failing us at times, and this may have been
due to a number of factors. Perhaps the issue at hand was not important to us at the time, and therefore we
devoted little attention to it. But imagine being in the scenario Wells (1993) suggests in the following passage:
Suppose that you were an eyewitness to a crime. Perhaps it was a theft, a burglary, a mugging, a drive-by
shooting, or a robbery. You might or might not have known that a crime was being committed at the time;
perhaps you saw someone exit a building that exploded a short time later. Perhaps you were the victim or
perhaps you were a bystander. Regardless of the circumstances, there exists some memory trace, however
strong or weak, that could have important consequences for the course of justice. Because you have seen the
culprit, the police ask you to give a description. Later, perhaps only hours or perhaps months later, you are
called to the police station to attempt an identification of the culprit. You are then shown a lineup or a photo
spread and asked to indicate whether the person you saw on that fateful occasion is one of the people standing
or pictured before you on this day. (p. 553)
Many factors influence the accuracy of recall and identity of a face, some of which we have little to no control
over. Given the right conditions, these factors will influence how one's memory recalls the specific features
that make one face distinct from another.
This article is available in The Review: A Journal of Undergraduate Student Research: http://fisherpub.sjfc.edu/ur/vol6/iss1/9
Factors Affecting the Accuracy of Eyewitness Identification 
By Sheena M. Lorenzo 
We've all experienced, at one time or another, our 
own memories failing us at times, and this may have 
been due to a number of factors. Perhaps the issue at 
hand was not important to us at the time, and therefore 
we devoted little attention to it. But imagine being in 
the scenario Wells (1993) suggests in the following 
passage: 
Suppose that you were an eyewitness to a crime. 
Perhaps it was a theft, a burglary, a mugging, a 
drive-by shooting, or a robbery. You might or 
might not have known that a crime was being 
committed at the time; perhaps you saw someone 
exit a building that exploded a short time later. 
Perhaps you were the victim or perhaps you were 
a bystander. Regardless of the circumstances, 
there exists some memory trace, however strong 
or weak, that could have important consequences 
for the course of justice. Because you have seen 
the culprit, the police ask you to give a 
description. Later, perhaps only hours or perhaps 
months later, you are called to the police station 
to attempt an identification of the culprit. You 
are then shown a lineup or a photo spread and 
asked to indicate whether the person you saw on 
that fateful occasion is one of the people standing 
or pictured before you on this day. (p. 553) 
Many factors influence the accuracy of recall and 
identity of a face, some of which we have little to no 
control over. Given the right conditions, these factors 
will influence how one's memory recalls the specific 
features that make one face distinct from another. 
Eyewitness testimony, most often serving as 
direct evidence in court, commonly proves to be a 
strong influence on juries (MacLin, et al., 2001). 
Unfortunately, a series of recent DNA exoneration 
cases shows evidence of the flaws in eyewitness 
identification, and how it may lead to the conviction 
of innocent people (MacLin, et al., 2001). MacLin 
and colleagues (2001), in a study of face recognition, 
cited four specific factors that influence an 
eyewitness's viewing conditions. These include: 
exposure time (the extent of time a person has to view 
the face), delay (amount of time between initial 
presentation of a stimulus and subsequent 
recognition), attention and arousal (the concentration 
of mental effort), and weapon focus (the presence of a 
weapon). 
In addition to these factors, Searcy and colleagues 
(1999) studied how age affects accuracy in face 
recognition. Their studies of aging and face 
recognition show a positive correlation between age 
(beginning at age 18) and false identification of new 
faces. 
Wells (1993) argues that the degree of certainty 
with which a false identification is made is a greater 
factor in the miscarriage of justice than the 
misidentification itself. He claims that the more 
similarities that exist between the witness's memory 
trace of the perpetrator and the identified person, the 
greater the degree of certainty that will be expressed 
in the identification. The more certainty an 
eyewitness expresses, the more likely they are to be 
seen by a jury as a credible witness. Chambers (2001) 
looks at suggestive questioning and biases in lineups 
as factors in misidentification. She reviews the 
possibility and result of misleading questions, and 
biased lineups and/or photo spreads. Finally, Shaw 
and Skolnick (1994), and Wright, Boyd, and Tredoux 
(2001) studied sex differences and the own-race 
biases, respectively, in face identification. The own-
race bias, or cross-race effect, states that faces of 
one's own race are more easily identified than faces of 
another, less familiar race (Meissner, et al., 2001). 
These nine factors (exposure time, delay, attention and 
arousal, weapon focus, age, degree of certainty, 
suggestive questioning and biased lineups, sex 
differences, and own-race bias) are of the most 
prominent factors, both internal (psychological and/or 
biological) and external (environmental), which affect 
face recognition and identification. All the above-
mentioned factors affecting eyewitness identification 
will now be further explored. 
Viewing Conditions 
There are four factors stated in MacLin and 
colleagues' 2001 study, which involve viewing 
conditions in the recognition of a face. These are: 
exposure time, delay, attention and arousal, and 
weapon focus. 
The length of time a witness has to observe a face 
affects their subsequent capacity to recognize that face 
(MacLin, et al., 2001). This is most commonly 
referred to as exposure, or study time. In a study 
conducted by Reynolds & Pezdek (1992 as cited in 
MacLin, et al., 2001), researchers had subjects view 
slides with different versions of faces for either twenty 
seconds or three seconds. As would be expected, they 
found that the longer the subjects had to view the face, 
the better their performance on subsequent recognition 
tasks. In relation to this, a 1979 study by Light, 
Kayra-Stuart, and Hollander (as cited in MacLin, et 
al., 2001; Sporer, et al., 1996) found that the 
difference in exposure time improved memory of 
unusual faces (highly attractive and highly 
unattractive) but had no influence on typical, neutrally 
rated faces. Note that in this study, participants viewed 
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the faces for twenty seconds and eight seconds 
(compared to twenty seconds and three seconds in the 
previous study). In the Shapiro and Penrod meta-
analysis (as cited in Sporer, et al., 1996) facial 
distinctiveness was a strong indicator of recognition 
accuracy rates, in both correct and incorrect 
identifications. 
Just as an increase in viewing time increased 
recognition rates, decreased viewing time lowered 
recognition rates due to an increase in false 
identifications (MacLin, et al., 2001). In reality, in 
actual eyewitness situations, suspects are seen for 
varying lengths of time, depending on the situation. It 
is important, when relying on the testimony of an 
eyewitness, to understand how varying exposure times 
can have an influence on the accuracy of 
identification, and pose the possible risk of false 
identification. 
Accuracy rates are also influenced by time 
delay—the amount of time that passes between seeing 
the culprit and identifying him/her. Barkowitz and 
Brigham (1982) worked with White and African-
American undergraduates to gauge their ability in 
correct identification of previously viewed faces of 
both races. The intervals of time delay varied between 
immediate, two days, and seven days. They found 
that recognition accuracy of faces decreased after long 
intervals. The longer the delay between presentation 
of the stimulus and subsequent recognition, the greater 
the chances of false identification. Studies have also 
found this to be true in cross-race identifications 
(MacLin, et al., 2001). Thus, race has no influence on 
the accuracy of identification when dealing with the 
time delay factor. It comes down to the simple fact 
that the longer one has gone without seeing a face, the 
harder it is to remember that face. On one final note, 
long intervals in delay have been shown to have very 
little effect on recognizing faces of acquaintances 
(MacLin, etal., 2001). 
Two factors not extensively studied but critical 
nonetheless to the reduction of optimal viewing 
conditions are attention and arousal. The 
concentration of mental effort (attention), and the 
general drive to exert mental effort and maintain 
perception (arousal) vary significantly in each 
eyewitness situation (MacLin, et al., 2001). Studying 
these factors is essential in determining the levels of 
arousal and attention that are optimal and damaging to 
the process of face recognition. Many studies have 
found a negative correlation between arousal and 
accurate face recall (MacLin, et al., 2001). To better 
understand this, take for example Peters' study (1988 
as cited in MacLin, et al., 2001). Participants were 
brought in to receive an immunization shot given by a 
nurse who also took the participant's pulse rate 
immediately after administering the shot. A short 
time later, a nurse's aide came in and took the 
participant's pulse once again. The pulse rates were 
higher when taken by the nurse, indicating higher 
levels of arousal (probably due to anxiety of the 
needle), and lower when taken by the nurse's aid—-
after they had some time to calm down. The 
participants returned days later for a follow up exam 
and were asked to recall specific details about the 
faces of both the nurse and the nurse's aid, and to 
identify the two from a photo spread. The results 
were as follows: the face of the nurse's aid was more 
frequently identified and more accurately recalled than 
that of the nurse. This study shows that higher levels 
of arousal contribute to lower levels of accurate 
recognition. This fact can be taken into account when 
assessing the credibility of an eyewitness. What the 
state of arousal was and how the witness reacted to the 
situation will influence the precision of their memory. 
Attention and arousal have also been found to be 
responsible for another factor affecting eyewitness 
identification: weapon focus. This phenomenon is 
exactly what it says—if, during the commission of the 
crime, the victim or witness sees a weapon present, 
the focus of attention automatically diverts to the 
weapon, and away from the face of the culprit 
(MacLin, et al., 2001). The presence of a weapon also 
increases arousal, which, as shown previously, 
decreases the accuracy of face identification. In 
addition to this, the interaction between attention and 
arousal may cause the witness to narrow additional 
focus, producing cue utilization (MacLin, et al., 2001). 
This hypothesis is based on the premise that in order 
to perform a task we must use external cues. The 
more multifaceted the task, the more cues that need to 
be attended to. As arousal increases due to weapon 
focus, performance decreases, thus reducing the scope 
of cues monitored. This results in peripheral cues, in 
this case the face, going ignored (MacLin, et al., 
2001). 
MacLin and colleagues (2001) identified and 
examined four important factors of face recognition 
and viewing conditions. These factors, separately and 
combined, affect the accuracy of eyewitness 
identification. It is crucial to be aware of these in 
order to knowledgably assess the credibility of an 
eyewitness. If these conditions were present, it may 
have caused the eyewitness to unknowingly make a 
false identification. 
Internal Factors 
Internal factors of influence in face 
recognition refer to the biological and psychological 
aspects, over which we have little to no control. Age, 
sex, and the own-race bias can all be considered 
internal factors. 
Across a number of studies on age and recall, 
there seems to be a common pattern that runs through 
all. The ability to recognize unfamiliar faces increases 
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steadily from childhood through adolescence, peaking 
between the ages of 14 and 17, and then slowly 
declining, dropping off sharply after age 50 (Cutler & 
Penrod, 1995). Older adults perform more poorly in 
differentiating a previously viewed stranger's face 
from an entirely new face (Searcy, et al., 1999). This 
can have important implications in the use of lineups 
and the treatment of elderly eyewitnesses, thus it is 
important to examine age-related discrepancies in 
identification. 
In their 1984 study, Chance and Goldstein (as 
cited in Cutler & Penrod, 1995) found that 
kindergarteners' percent of accuracy in identifying a 
face fell between 35 and 40%; 6 to 8-year olds fell 
between 50 and 58%, 9 to 11-year-olds fell between 
60 and 70%, and by age 12 to 14 the percent of correct 
identifications fell between 70 and 80%. However, 
Parker, Haverfield, and Baker-Thomas (1986 as cited 
in Cutler & Penrod, 1995) conducted their study on 
elementary school children, with an average age of 
eight years old, and compared them to college 
students. When asked to identify the culprit of a 
simulated crime, "the two groups did not differ with 
respect to identification accuracy, but the elementary 
school subjects were more likely to change their 
lineup choices" (Cutler & Penrod, 1995, p. 82). 
Similarly, O'Rourke and colleagues (1989 as 
cited in Cutler & Penrod, 1995) gathered college 
students and community members ranging between 
the ages of 18 and 72, and showed a videotape 
reenactment of a robbery. The researchers had the 
subjects identify the culprit from robber-present and 
robber-absent lineups. The percentages of correct 
identifications were as follows: 51% for the 18 to 19-
year-olds; 47% for 20-29; 46% for 30-39; 42% for 40-
49; 29% for 50-59; and 60 to 72-year-olds correctly 
identified the culprit only 25% of the time (Cutler & 
Penrod, 1995). These studies and many others show 
developmental trends in the accuracy of facial 
identity. 
Similar to the well-known own-race bias (which 
will be discussed later) is the own-sex bias. The own-
sex bias, the belief that humans can more easily recall 
a face of their own sex than that of the opposite sex, 
could explain the differences among men and women 
in eyewitness reliability (Shaw & Skolnick, 1994). 
The Shapiro and Penrod meta-analysis (Cutler & 
Penrod, 1995) found that generally females were 
somewhat more likely to make accurate 
identifications, but also made false identifications 
more often than men. The particular situation in 
which an event takes place plays a large part in these 
differences. For example, Clifford and Scott (1978 as 
cited in Shaw & Skolnick, 1994) found that men were 
more accurate than women in their identification when 
the target was part of a violent scenario. When the 
scenario was nonviolent, there showed no sex 
difference. However, studies show females are 
superior under particular circumstances. Yarmey and 
Kent (1980 as cited in Shaw & Skolnick, 1994) found 
females to be more accurate in identifying a female 
bystander, but not in identifying a male aggressor in a 
crime scene. Christiansen, Ochalek, and Sweeney 
(1984 as cited in Shaw & Skolnick, 1994) found 
females to be more accurate than males in identifying 
a female confederate. Powers, Andriks, and Loftus 
(1979 as cited in Shaw & Skolnick, 1994) found that 
when dealing with female-oriented details, females 
were both more accurate eyewitnesses and more 
resilient to misleading questions, just as males were 
more accurate eyewitnesses and more resilient to 
misleading questions when dealing with male-oriented 
details. This quantity of evidence suggests the own-
sex bias serving a role in eyewitness identification. In 
sum, females tend to recall other female faces more 
accurately than males do, and males tend to recall 
other male faces better than females do. 
Almost identical in theory to the own-sex bias is 
the own-race bias.1 This term refers to the discovery 
that faces of one's own race are better recognized than 
faces of another, less familiar race (Wright, et al., 
2001). A recent meta-analysis (Field, in press as cited 
in Wright, et al., 2001) found that people were 1.38 
times more likely to accurately recall the face of 
another who is of the same race, than of someone who 
is of a different race. Additionally, people are 1.50 
times less likely to falsely identify a face of their own 
race. The cause of this can be attributed to the idea of 
outgroup homogeneity. An outgroup is a group with 
which a person feels no sense of membership or 
identity (Brehm, et al., 2002). The idea of outgroup 
homogeneity is that, generally, people perceive there 
to be a greater similarity among members of an 
outgroup than they do among members of their own 
ingroup, in other words "they are all alike." 
According to Brehm and colleagues (2002), "To 
people outside the group, outgroup members can even 
seem to look alike—people are less accurate in 
distinguishing and recognizing faces of members of 
racial groups other than their own" (p. 135). The 
own-race bias can play a profound role in the correct 
identification of an offender. The race of the 
witness/victim compared to the race of the aggressor 
is a significant factor in assessing the accuracy of 
eyewitness identification. Even biological factors, 
such as age, race, and gender contribute to how our 
memory recalls certain events and details. These 
factors, separately and combined, are important 
indicators of an eyewitness's accuracy. 
1
 Much in-depth review and analysis has been 
conducted on the own-race bias, which is too vast for 
the purposes of this paper. Only the basics of this 
topic will be covered here. 
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External Factors 
External factors, such as suggestive questioning 
and lineup biases, affect the degree of certainty in 
one's decision, and this, in turn, affects the accuracy 
in the identification process. 
Lineup biases refer to the method with which law 
enforcement officials go about conducting a lineup. 
These may include choosing distracters to be in the 
lineup, and/or deciding which method of lineup 
identification will be used—sequential versus 
simultaneous. The basic process in lineup 
identifications is the relative-judgment process. 
Simply put, eyewitnesses select the suspect from the 
lineup that most resembles their memory trace of the 
culprit (Wells, 1995). This process however, is only 
effective when the actual offender is present in the 
lineup. When the real offender is not present, there is 
still one suspect in the lineup that resembles him/her 
more than the others, and due to this, relative 
judgment alone cannot determine whether the witness 
made a correct identification (Wells, 1995). 
The use of a distracter, or a "filler," in the lineup 
who is known ahead of time to be innocent of the 
crime, affects the rates of false identifications. Wells 
(1995) notes that the term "false identification" refers 
to the identification of an innocent suspect (an 
unknown error), rather than the mistaken 
identification of a distracter (a known error). If the 
police place distracters in the lineup who do not match 
the description of the suspect, but then put one person 
in the lineup who they think is the actual offender and 
who more closely matches the description, this has 
created a bias and increases the chances of false 
identification (Wells, 1995). For example, say a 
witness described the culprit as being a tall male with 
dark hair and a mole on his face. In the lineup, there 
are six tall dark haired males; however, only one has a 
mole on his face. It can be assumed, using relative 
judgment, that the eyewitness will choose the man 
with the mole whether he is the right person or not. 
The use of distracters who match the description of 
the culprit lower false identification rates by 
increasing the chances that a distracter will be chosen 
by the eyewitness. 
A sequential lineup is one in which the witness 
views one face at a time and must decide whether the 
suspect is in fact the culprit before moving on to the 
next face. This is compared to the traditional 
sequential lineup in which the eyewitness is shown all 
suspects at the same time. Lindsay and Wells (1985 
as cited in Wells, 1995) determined that eyewitnesses 
could not make relative judgments in this kind of 
lineup, because though they can be sure that one face 
matches more accurately to their memory than the 
ones previous, they do not know if the next face (not 
yet seen) matches their memory trace even better. 
They found that this type of lineup, compared to a 
simultaneous lineup, yields less false identification, 
without a decrease in rates of accurate identification. 
In sequential lineups, the judgment process is 
transferred from making comparisons between lineup 
members to making comparisons between each 
individual lineup member and the witness's memory 
for the culprit (Wells, 1995). This is what makes 
sequential lineups more successful. 
Malpass and Devine (1981 as cited in Chambers, 
2001) found the significance that biased instructions 
had in altering a person's accuracy in recall. In their 
research they found that when a subject was asked 
"which of these people" is the culprit, the subject 
identified someone 78% of the time from a lineup in 
which the real criminal was not present, thus all 
identifications were wrong. This type of questioning 
suggests that the offender is present in the lineup and 
the witness feels compelled to make a decision. 
However, when subjects were told that the offender 
may or may not be in the lineup, identification rates 
dropped to 33%. These findings show that when an 
eyewitness is aware that the actual offender may not 
be in the lineup, they are apt to use more strict criteria 
in making their choice, and realize that the person who 
most resembles their memory's image may not 
actually be the culprit (Chambers, 2001). 
Confidence plays a large role in the perceived 
accuracy of an eyewitness identification. The more 
confident a witness is, the more credible they are seen 
by a jury. However, complete certainty is not always 
a guarantee of accuracy. There are a few factors that 
go into producing and maintaining certainty. The 
level of certainty in an eyewitness identification is 
determined by post-identification information (Wells, 
1993). Extramemorial sources are an example of this. 
If a witness makes a speculative identification, and 
later is informed that the burglar identified was found 
with the stolen goods, the witness's certainty is sure to 
increase, even though their memory of the culprit is no 
better than before (Wells, 1993). In 1991, Luus (as 
cited in Wells, 1993) staged a crime in front of two 
people: one was a confederate of the experiment, and 
the other a subject. The subject believed they had 
viewed an actual crime. The two witnesses were 
asked separately to identify the culprit, and then 
together reported their decision to a police officer 
(who was also a confederate). The subject's level of 
certainty varied depending on (1) if they learned that 
their co-witness identified the same person as they 
did, (2) if they learned that their co-witness identified 
a different person, or (3) if the co-witness decided the 
culprit was not in the line up. In each of the previous 
three conditions, the subject's confidence decreased 
(i.e., the subject's confidence was highest when they 
thought their co-witness identified the same person as 
they did, and lowest when their co-witness believed 
the culprit was not present in the line up). 
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Shaw (Shaw, 1996; Shaw & McClure, 1996 as 
cited in Smith, et al., 2000) studied the confidence-
accuracy correlation and demonstrated that post-event 
questioning reduces this correlation. Shaw 
consistently found that post-event questioning led to 
an increase in confidence in incorrect choices, but not 
always in correct choices. This shows that post-event 
questioning can lead to an increase in certainty 
without an increase to accuracy (Smith, et al., 2000). 
It is important to understand and apply the 
significance of these findings because in reality, a 
witness will have to go through much post-event 
questioning both immediately after the event and in 
preparation for trial. 
All external factors discussed were post-event 
factors that affect the decisions made by the 
eyewitness in the identification process. They deal 
with the type of lineups and questioning that may alter 
a witness's choice, force them to make a decision, and 
make them more confident in their decision even 
though their memory for the culprit has not improved. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Though there has been extensive research 
conducted on what affects the accuracy of eyewitness 
identification, there still exist areas that can be further 
explored. As mentioned earlier, the length of time 
delay between viewing the subject and subsequent 
recognition plays an important role in memory 
accuracy. However, Barkowitz and Brigham (1982) 
and MacLin and colleagues (2001) failed to 
investigate the potentiality of contemplation during 
this waiting period. Future research could look into 
this area and study whether a witness's memory for a 
crime changes as a result of having the opportunity to 
think, replay the events, and reflect on the events that 
occurred. 
Another area that could potentially be explored is 
the idea of briefly informing jury members, before the 
trial begins, of these factors involved in assessing the 
accuracy of eyewitness testimony. Since the internal 
factors mentioned previously are beyond one's 
control, there is little anyone can do to control them. 
However, knowing that they exist can help jurors 
more critically gauge accuracy and examine testimony 
more thoroughly. 
Conversely, what we can control are the external 
factors. Fisher and Geiselman (1994) worked to 
develop a set of retrieval mechanisms used in post-
event questioning, when the memory is more 
susceptible to strategic control. Fisher and Geiselman 
cited hypnosis as a method of possible memory 
improvement. However, it was quickly discredited 
due to studies that reject the idea that hypnosis has any 
effect on memory enhancement. Additionally, 
hypnosis has been fond, in some cases, to actually 
distort memories. Therefore, they sought to apply 
widely accepted principles of memory to develop an 
original memory enhancing technique. They called 
this the Cognitive Interview, consisting of four 
retrieval mnemonics. These include: "(a) mentally 
reinstating the environmental and personal context 
that existed at the time of the crime, (b) reporting 
everything, regardless of the perceived importance of 
the information...(c) recounting the events in a variety 
of temporal orders (e.g., both foreword and backward) 
and (d) reporting the events from a variety of 
perspectives (e.g., from that of the witness and also 
from that of a prominent character)" (Fisher & 
Geiselman, 1994, p. 246). With this new way of 
questioning, they found that considerably more correct 
statements were brought forth by the Cognitive 
Interview than by hypnosis or standard interview. 
Comparing the difference between effective and 
ineffective interview techniques, Fisher and 
Geiselman (1994) found that effective interviewers 
ask more open-ended questions, allowing the witness 
to think and express their thoughts more freely. 
Ineffective interviews contain more direct, short 
answer questions. In addition, the Cognitive 
Interview seems to reduce the biasing effects of 
leading questions. 
The precision of the interview method is heavily 
relied upon for accuracy and amount of details of an 
event that are recalled. Nearly all law enforcement 
officials use a standard, common sense approach to 
interviewing an eyewitness. However, it has been 
shown that this method is not as effective, nor is it as 
efficient, as scientifically developed techniques based 
on controlled studies. Careful treatment of the 
memory is very important when dealing with the 
accuracy of eyewitness identification. It does not take 
much to completely distort the recollection of an 
event, especially if it occurred a while back. By 
carefully and patiently extracting bits and pieces of an 
event, the likelihood of accuracy increases. 
Eyewitness testimony often has a robust impact 
on juries, and may be the deciding factor of whether a 
defendant is convicted or let go. Regardless of the 
integrity jurors credit to eyewitness testimony, 
scientific studies of perception and memory have 
continually confirmed that such testimony is subject to 
inaccuracy. 
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